> ## Content Index > Fetch the complete content index at: https://sourced.cbrasch.me/llms.txt > Use this file to discover other available public pages before exploring further. # The Flock Safety camera at the end of your road is watching; it’s not just reading plates. - URL: https://sourced.cbrasch.me/flockwatching/ - Published: 2026-07-27T23:10:00.000Z - Updated: 2026-09-23T05:03:42.000Z - Author: Christian Brasch - Tags: Opinion, Technology Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs) have been sold to the American public with a singular and agreeable compromise: that they would only read our license plates in order to catch aggressive criminals, traffic rule violators, and recover stolen vehicles. Today, this technology has quietly slid itself into pervasive territory, nearly becoming an unregulated dragnet. According to deflock.org, Flock Safety is one of the largest ALPR providers, as Flock Safety maintains and operates around 80,000 to 100,000 cameras across the United States, producing more than twenty billion scans every single month. We are sacrificing a large amount of our civil rights for a system that is being actively weaponized, is alarmingly insecure, and devastatingly inaccurate. --- ### Flock’s Scope Creep: It’s more than just a license plate reader Vendors such as Flock have marketed their devices as a simple license plate reader & locally-controllable security camera to the general public. Recent evidence, however, has revealed that these systems do much more. These cameras now rely on advanced AI algorithms and “vehicle signature” technology, cataloging the makes, models, precise color, bumper stickers, and even specific physical damage to cars. But it’s not just vehicles; Recent leaks & public speech slip-ups have revealed evidence that these Flock cameras collect facial recognition data, alongside data about the specific apparel and accessories that individuals wear on a day-to-day basis, as well as building a timeline about their location whereabouts by creating a database of surveillance footage that can be queried through an AI-powered, Google-like search bar. When you dig more into their website, images representing this technology become more & more apparent. ![](https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1000/1*urb7_ZJ2xlTn1Ot91Owfpw.png) A screenshot of Flock Safety’s [“FreeForm Search” feature page](https://www.flocksafety.com/products/flock-freeform?ref=sourced.cbrasch.me). This data is then inserted into a database alongside numerous other identifying sources, including public court records, [OSINT](https://medium.com/@techmindxperts/the-beginners-guide-to-open-source-intelligence-osint-techniques-and-tools-6a91b9c37ee1?ref=sourced.cbrasch.me), Jail Records, Call Audio, device telemetry data (which can be collected from you by simply passing by a Flock camera), & more. What began as a license plate reader has quietly evolved into a persistent profile of who you are, where you go, and who you know… assembled without a warrant, without notice, and without your consent. ### Weaponized: from stolen-vehicle alerts to a tool for stalking, ICE, and protest surveillance The most damning evidence against Flock isn’t a hypothetical, it’s already on the record. An ongoing review by the Institute for Justice has identified *at least* 28 cases nationwide of officers allegedly abusing ALPR data to track romantic partners and exes, with the bulk of those incidents happening since 2024\. A Kansas police chief searched his former girlfriend’s vehicle 164 times. A Georgia deputy allegedly searched the plate of a woman he was having an affair with 1,639 times. These aren’t rookies fumbling around with a policy manual; these are the people trusted with the keys to the network of our personal data. The abuse scales beyond individual officers. In May 2026, an audit revealed that data from Dayton’s cameras had been searched more than 7,100 times for ‘immigration enforcement purposes’; searches that are strictly prohibited under the city’s own policy. City officials called the violations “egregious,” and, since they were unable to immediately remove the cameras due to the complicated contract they signed, they decided to cover all 72 cameras with trash bags. San Francisco’s police chief disclosed at a June 2026 police commission meeting that the Northern California Regional Intelligence Center had queried the city’s Flock network on behalf of federal and out-of-state agencies. This adds up to 299 improper inquiries over roughly one year. Mountain View found the same pattern and shut its cameras off entirely. And then there is the surveillance of protected speech. EFF’s analysis of more than 12 million searches logged by more than 3,900 agencies between December 2024 and October 2025 revealed hundreds of searches that were tied to political demonstrations: the “50501" protests in February, “Hands Off” protests in April, and “No Kings” protests in June and October. Nineteen agencies conducted dozens of searches specifically tied to the “No Kings” protests alone. A camera network sold to your city council as a stolen-car recovery tool is being pointed, in practice, at people exercising their First Amendment rights. ### Insecure: a national surveillance network built on hard-coded passwords and physical-access exploits If the political abuse of Flock isn’t enough to give you pause, its engineering will. In the fall of 2025, a security researcher, Jon Gaines, documented 51 different findings across Flock’s device ecosystem, including the Falcon and Sparrow license plate cameras, as well as Flock’s Raven gunshot detection microphones. Twenty-two of those findings were assigned CVEs by MITRE (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures), with eight more pending. Cybersecurity & Engineering researchers revealed that Flock Safety cameras can be compromised in under 30 seconds through a simple button sequence on the device’s back panel. The cloud side is no better. In January 2026, Flock Safety confirmed that a large number of Condor cameras had been exposed to the open internet, allowing outsiders to view live feeds, watch about a month’s worth of archival footage, and even delete video from the system. In November 2025, more than 35 stolen law enforcement passwords for Flock Safety appeared on Russian cybercrime forums; credentials to a shared national surveillance network photographing over 20 billion vehicles per month. Additionally, Flock later confirmed that roughly 3% of its law enforcement customers had not enabled multi-factor authentication. Among Gaines’s findings were hardcoded passwords buried inside Flock’s Raven gunshot detection devices (CVE-2025-47821), hardcoded Java Keystore passwords in Flock’s Android app (CVE-2025-59407), and development Wi-Fi credentials left in cleartext inside the production firmware of Flock’s license plate readers (CVE-2025-59409). Static, factory-set credentials in production hardware are the type of mistake in engineering that gets a junior developer written up, not the type of mistake that belongs in devices photographing 20 billion vehicles a month and feeding arrest decisions. Senator [Ron Wyden’s letter to the FTC](https://www.wyden.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/wyden%5Fletter%5Fto%5Fftc%5Fon%5Fflockpdf.pdf?ref=sourced.cbrasch.me) put it plainly: Flock Safety has “unnecessarily exposed” Americans’ sensitive personal data to theft by hackers and foreign spies.” The company that asks us to trade our privacy for public safety cannot, by its own admission, keep its own doors locked. ### Inaccurate: From misread digits to wrongful arrests miles from the scene Flock advertises itself as precise. The reality is that even a small error rate, multiplied across 20 billion scans a month, produces a steady stream of innocent people who are looking down the barrel of a service pistol. In February 2026, a Flock camera in Sherwood, Arkansas, misread the license plate of an SUV, leading officers to detain an innocent couple at gunpoint while their six-week-old baby sat alone in a car seat in the back of the vehicle. In Morristown, Tennessee, the plate “LOVEY” was misread as the stolen “L0VEY.” An elderly couple was ordered out at gunpoint and handcuffed in front of their young granddaughter. The problem isn’t only its poor optical character recognition; it’s the AI-driven “vehicle appearance” matching that Flock has bolted on top of it. In San Diego, officers relying on a Flock hit arrested a man for an attempted carjacking that had happened five miles away, at a moment his car had already been photographed by an entirely different camera. The Flock system had matched the wrong red Alfa Romeo. A passenger in that car spent nearly a month in jail before the mistake was untangled. The Institute for Justice has documented at least 27 incorrect stops since 2018, with the majority happening since 2023, and in nearly two-thirds of the cases officers did not realize their error until after they had drawn and pointed their guns at innocent people. A police-run study in Vallejo, California found that up to 37% of ALPR hits were inaccurate. Flock’s own advertised figure of “93% accuracy” sounds respectable until you remember that at 20 billion plates a month, the remaining 7% is more than a billion misreads. Every one of those is a potential traffic stop, a potential gunpoint order to exit the vehicle, a potential wrong name in a police report. ### Dishonest: The talking points your local police are reading came from Flock It’s also worth remembering that a lot of what your local officials will tell you about how these cameras came directly from Flock. The company routinely provides police departments with talking points, coaching, and pitch materials designed to sell the technology to city councils, and those talking points have a documented pattern of being wrong. Flock has falsely claimed a partnership with the ACLU in front of an Illinois city council, and in Loveland, Colorado, told the local police chief that federal agents could not access the town’s ALPR data. The company was later forced to admit contracts with Customs and Border Protection and the Department of Homeland Security, and its CEO conceded that Flock had provided “inaccurate information.” The pattern is consistent enough that the ACLU has publicly advised government officials to be “extremely hesitant to believe anything Flock tells them” about its own products. ### Flock’s bill comes due Flock’s pitch has always been a bargain: a little privacy for a lot of safety. However, the evidence of the last two years makes it clear that we are not getting the safety, and we have already given up far more than a little privacy. The cameras are being turned on protesters and ex-partners. The infrastructure is penetrable enough that stolen credentials sit on foreign forums. The AI at the heart of the system is confident enough to send police to the wrong house with their weapons drawn. More and more communities are rejecting these cameras, from Framingham, MA declining to renew its contract, to Bay City voting 6 to 2 against a Flock deal. My home county, Lenoir County, doesn’t have to be a footnote in that story. It can be a chapter in it. The camera on HWY 55 is not a piece of “street furniture”; it is a node in a national surveillance network and database with a documented history of abuse, breach, and error. The question isn’t whether we can trust it. The question is why we were ever asked to trust it in the first place. ### Sources As a cybersecurity student, I’ve committed to extensive research on this issue over the past few months, and now that it has reached my hometown, I decided to write about it myself. These are 23 of the sources I browsed, verified, and studied over that time, and which shaped this article: Freeman, Will. *Flock Safety Camera Map and Statistics.* [https://deflock.org](http://deflock.org/?ref=sourced.cbrasch.me). Accessed July 2026. Flock Safety. *FreeForm Search Product Page.* Flock Safety, [https://www.flocksafety.com/products/flock-freeform](https://www.flocksafety.com/products/flock-freeform?ref=sourced.cbrasch.me). Byrd, Ryan. “Lenoir County Sheriff’s Office Confirms Use of Flock License Plate Reader Cameras.” *Neuse News*, 1 June 2026, [https://www.neusenews.com/index/2026/6/1/lenoir-county-sheriffs-office-confirms-use-of-flock-license-plate-reader-cameras.](https://www.neusenews.com/index/2026/6/1/lenoir-county-sheriffs-office-confirms-use-of-flock-license-plate-reader-cameras?ref=sourced.cbrasch.me) Coldewey, Devin. “The Backlash Against Flock Cameras Is Spreading.” *Malwarebytes Labs*, 20 July 2026, [https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2026/07/the-backlash-against-flock-cameras-is-spreading](https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2026/07/the-backlash-against-flock-cameras-is-spreading?ref=sourced.cbrasch.me). Ingraham, Christopher. “Police Have Reportedly Used License Plate Readers to Stalk Romantic Interests at Least 28 Times in Recent Years.” *ij.org*, 27 April 2026, [https://ij.org/police-have-reportedly-used-license-plate-readers-to-stalk-romantic-interests-at-least-14-times-in-recent-years/](https://ij.org/police-have-reportedly-used-license-plate-readers-to-stalk-romantic-interests-at-least-14-times-in-recent-years/?ref=sourced.cbrasch.me). Muse, Alexander. “The Camera That Convicts Killers and Stalks Ex-Girlfriends: The Flock Dilemma No One Can Resolve.” *AmuseOnX Newsletter*, 24 July 2026, [https://newsletter.amuseonx.com/p/the-camera-that-convicts-killers](https://newsletter.amuseonx.com/p/the-camera-that-convicts-killers?ref=sourced.cbrasch.me). Ramsey, Mireya. “Flock Safety Crosses 100,000 Cameras as 53 Cities Cancel Over Unauthorized Federal Data Access.” *TechTimes*, 29 June 2026, [https://www.techtimes.com/articles/319317/20260629/flock-safety-crosses-100000-cameras-53-cities-cancel-over-unauthorized-federal-data-access.htm](https://www.techtimes.com/articles/319317/20260629/flock-safety-crosses-100000-cameras-53-cities-cancel-over-unauthorized-federal-data-access.htm?ref=sourced.cbrasch.me). Lutz, Bryan. “Flock Safety’s Billion-Dollar Surveillance Machine Caught Sharing Your Data With The Feds.” *The Daily Bell*, 21 July 2026, [https://thedailybell.com/all-articles/editorials/flock-safetys-billion-dollar-surveillance-machine-caught-sharing-your-data-with-the-feds/](https://thedailybell.com/all-articles/editorials/flock-safetys-billion-dollar-surveillance-machine-caught-sharing-your-data-with-the-feds/?ref=sourced.cbrasch.me). Electronic Frontier Foundation. “EFF’s Investigations Expose Flock Safety’s Surveillance Abuses: 2025 in Review.” *EFF Deeplinks Blog*, 30 December 2025, [https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/12/effs-investigations-expose-flock-safetys-surveillance-abuses-2025-review](https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/12/effs-investigations-expose-flock-safetys-surveillance-abuses-2025-review?ref=sourced.cbrasch.me). WFLX Staff. “Flock Safety Exposed Live Police Camera Feeds in Internet Data Breach, Company Says.” *WFLX*, 9 January 2026, [https://www.wflx.com/2026/01/09/flock-safety-exposed-live-police-camera-feeds-internet-data-breach-company-says/](https://www.wflx.com/2026/01/09/flock-safety-exposed-live-police-camera-feeds-internet-data-breach-company-says/?ref=sourced.cbrasch.me). Gaines, Jon. *Examining the Security Posture of an Anti-Crime Ecosystem.* GainSec White Paper, November 2025, [https://github.com/GainSec/anti-crime-ecosystem-research](https://github.com/GainSec/anti-crime-ecosystem-research?ref=sourced.cbrasch.me). TeamPassword. “The Database Behind Every Camera on Your Street.” *TeamPassword Blog*, 3 June 2026, [https://teampassword.com/blog/flock-safety-cybersecurity-implications](https://teampassword.com/blog/flock-safety-cybersecurity-implications?ref=sourced.cbrasch.me). Cole, Matt. “Critical Security Vulnerabilities Exposed in Flock Safety Surveillance Cameras: A Comprehensive Analysis of the 2025 Research Findings.” *Info by Matt Cole*, 11 December 2025, [https://infobymattcole.com/index.php/2025/12/11/critical-security-vulnerabilities-exposed-in-flock-safety-surveillance-cameras-a-comprehensive-analysis-of-the-2025-research-findings/](https://infobymattcole.com/index.php/2025/12/11/critical-security-vulnerabilities-exposed-in-flock-safety-surveillance-cameras-a-comprehensive-analysis-of-the-2025-research-findings/?ref=sourced.cbrasch.me). Wyden, Ron, and Raja Krishnamoorthi. *Letter to the Federal Trade Commission Regarding Flock Safety Cybersecurity Practices.* United States Senate, November 2025, [https://www.wyden.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/wyden\_letter\_to\_ftc\_on\_flockpdf.pdf](https://www.wyden.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/wyden%5Fletter%5Fto%5Fftc%5Fon%5Fflockpdf.pdf?ref=sourced.cbrasch.me). Institute for Justice. “Dozens of Innocent Motorists Have Been Pulled Over, Detained at Gunpoint, or Jailed Due to AI License Plate Camera Errors.” *ij.org*, July 2026, [https://ij.org/dozens-of-innocent-motorists-have-been-pulled-over-detained-at-gunpoint-or-jailed-due-to-ai-license-plate-camera-errors/](https://ij.org/dozens-of-innocent-motorists-have-been-pulled-over-detained-at-gunpoint-or-jailed-due-to-ai-license-plate-camera-errors/?ref=sourced.cbrasch.me). TMPC Inc. “False Flags, Personal Agendas, and Why Human-in-the-Loop Is Non-Negotiable.” *tmpcinc.com*, July 2026, [https://www.tmpcinc.com/false-flags-personal-agendas-and-why-human-in-the-loop-is-non-negotiable/](https://www.tmpcinc.com/false-flags-personal-agendas-and-why-human-in-the-loop-is-non-negotiable/?ref=sourced.cbrasch.me). Marx, Jesse. “A Flock License Plate Reader Linked a San Diego Man to a Violent Crime. He Was Five Miles Away.” *Times of San Diego*, 7 June 2026, [https://timesofsandiego.com/crime/2026/06/07/a-flock-license-plate-reader-linked-a-san-diego-man-to-a-violent-crime-he-was-five-miles-away/](https://timesofsandiego.com/crime/2026/06/07/a-flock-license-plate-reader-linked-a-san-diego-man-to-a-violent-crime-he-was-five-miles-away/?ref=sourced.cbrasch.me). Stop ALPRs Coalition. *Stop ALPRs.* [stopalprs.com](http://stopalprs.com/?ref=sourced.cbrasch.me). Accessed July 2026. American Civil Liberties Union. “Fight Creepy ALPR Cameras.” *ACLU Campaigns and Initiatives*, July 2026, [https://www.aclu.org/campaigns-initiatives/get-the-flock-out](https://www.aclu.org/campaigns-initiatives/get-the-flock-out?ref=sourced.cbrasch.me). Cox, Joseph. “License Plate Reader Company Flock Is Building a Massive People Lookup Tool, Leak Shows.” *404 Media*, 2025, [https://www.404media.co/license-plate-reader-company-flock-is-building-a-massive-people-lookup-tool-leak-shows/](https://www.404media.co/license-plate-reader-company-flock-is-building-a-massive-people-lookup-tool-leak-shows/?ref=sourced.cbrasch.me). *Baldassari, Erin. “Flock Is Quietly Training Bay Area Police to Sway City Leaders to Buy Surveillance Tech.”* The Oaklandside*, 28 May 2026,* [*https://oaklandside.org/2026/05/28/flock-training-police-city-councils-webinar/*](https://oaklandside.org/2026/05/28/flock-training-police-city-councils-webinar/?ref=sourced.cbrasch.me)*.* *Marlow, Chad. Stanley, Jay. Nathan Freed Wessler. “Flock Safety Credibility Lost as It Repeatedly Lies to City Councils, Police Departments, and Public Across the Country.”* American Civil Liberties Union*, July 2026,* [*https://www.aclu.org/news/privacy-technology/tracking-alpr-cameras/flock-safety-credibility-lost-as-it-repeatedly-lies-to-city-councils-police-departments-and-public-across-the-country*](https://www.aclu.org/news/privacy-technology/tracking-alpr-cameras/flock-safety-credibility-lost-as-it-repeatedly-lies-to-city-councils-police-departments-and-public-across-the-country?ref=sourced.cbrasch.me)*.* *Fernando, Aaron. “How to Kick Out Flock and Organize to Stop Mass Surveillance.”* Shareable*, July 2026,* [*https://www.shareable.net/how-to/kick-out-flock/*](https://www.shareable.net/how-to/kick-out-flock/?ref=sourced.cbrasch.me)*.*